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ing of circumstances, history, and future possibilities, all within an overarch-
ing theological framework.
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A brief glance at the rise of “responsibility” as a core theme in ethics yields 
some insights regarding the relative role of thinking as it impinges on pro-
fessional responsibility. I begin with Weber’s notion that an ethic of respon-
sibility is one in which “one has to give an account of the foreseeable results 
of one’s actions.”2 In this notion, accountability and responsibility are clearly 
linked: to be responsible is to be held accountable for one’s actions and their 
results. Indeed, holding one responsible in the sense of accountable is one of 
the two approaches that Albert Jonsen identi. es as dominant in philosophi-
cal understandings of responsibility.3 We attribute responsibility to people 
when we hold them accountable: they can be blamed or praised for what 
they do; their actions may be justly rewarded or punished. To be respon-
sible means “owning up to” our deeds and acts.4 Attributing responsibility 
means expecting agents to defend their actions, to give reasons that hold up 
to public scrutiny. Agents are not responsible if they act under constraint 
or ignorance, and responsibility may be mitigated if there are excusing cir-
cumstances. But we expect an agent to deliberate, to have clear intentions, 
and to have motives that are suf. ciently transparent to be defensible. This 
is one clear public meaning of “responsible.” It focuses on actions and their 
justi. cation.
A second clear public meaning also emerges in philosophical literature. 
Responsibility is not simply about actions, and it is not simply something at-
tributed to others; it is something that we also claim for ourselves. We grow 
into responsibility by taking it on ourselves, by becoming responsible people. 
My mother used to say that I was “overly” responsible. By this, she meant that 
I took on responsibility where I was not necessarily expected to do so. I wor-
ried about things, I worked hard to make them come out right, and I carried 
a sense of caring for the world around me that left me always feeling respon-
sible. Responsibility in this sense focuses not on particular actions and their 
justi. cation, but on character and moral agency.
Responsibility requires that we have a “self” or center of integrity. It re-
quires that we exercise foresight into possible consequences of our actions. It 
requires that we are conscientious about what we do, not simply reacting but 
deliberating and being serious. Our actions over time should exhibit some 
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What Was I Thinking?! Every one of us has probably at some time in our lives 
looked back and wondered, “What was I thinking?” In the country-western 
song by that title, the youth admits he was not thinking.1 He was carried 
away by a little white tank top; in the thrall of lust, he did some very stupid 
things. Whether it is lust or loyalty or love or longing or simply a lapse in 
judgment, most of us have moments when we have made bad decisions. 
With the bene. t of hindsight—and a big sigh or two—we wonder “what 
was I thinking?” Or perhaps we ruefully admit: I wasn’t thinking.
The indiscretions of youth may be somewhat forgivable, but those of 
professionals are less so. Professionals are expected to be responsible, account-
able. But what do these elusive terms mean, and what is the role of thinking in 
responsibility? This essay attempts to answer these questions. I will argue that 
responsibility requires a certain kind of thinking—a pondering and consider-
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tion of the meaning of all actions within an ongoing community. He gives us, 
as Bush notes, a “cathekontic” ethics—an ethics of the “. tting.”7
Niebuhr contrasted his ethics of the . tting with two other approaches 
to ethics: the teleological that focuses on results or consequences of an action, 
and the deontological that focuses on doing one’s duty in accord with rules. It 
is not enough simply to try to maximize good consequences; while results are 
important, a focus solely on future outcomes neglects important dimensions 
of ethics. In particular, it neglects past histories. If we have harmed someone 
in the past, we have responsibilities to them that we do not have to those 
whom we have not harmed. We have a duty of reparation, for example. In 
his study of the possibilities of dialogue among different religious traditions, 
Lewis Mudge suggests that responsibility means “being accountable to hu-
mankind for wrongs that have been done in the name of religion.”8 Part of the 
task of interpretation is discerning what past actions mean for present duties. 
We may have duties of gratitude, reparation, justice, or not-harming that can 
trump concerns for future outcomes.9
But it is also not enough to focus on duties, especially if these are iden-
ti. ed with rules. Our particular responsibility in a given situation is never 
fully de. ned by a rule. It must be discerned with wisdom and insight. As I 
write this essay, Haiti struggles to deal with the aftermath of a devastating 
earthquake. From my small rural hospital in northern California, six members 
of the medical team (three doctors, three nurses, and an emergency medical 
technician) are on their way to Haiti to help. They had no speci. c “duty” to 
do this; indeed, they may have had to put aside duties to their local patients 
in order to go. Yet they felt a sense of responsibility to utilize their specialized 
skills in the crisis situation and assist as best they could. Their response, even 
if not required by rules or by the stated duties of their professions, is “. tting.”
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But how does one determine a . tting response? There is a danger in re-
sponsibility ethics that may be illustrated by Joseph Fletcher’s adaptation of 
the concept. In Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work, Fletcher delib-
erately draws on Niebuhr.10 He focuses on Niebuhr’s . rst aspect: response. 
“The factor of response [is] the real key to responsibility,” declares Fletcher.11 
In responsibility ethics, the burden is on the action-taker: the question is 
not ‘what should I do?’ but ‘what should I do?’ Rules will not help us; we 
must simply decide in the unique and transient situation in which we . nd 
consistency. Finally, we must be willing to be identi. ed with our actions: to be 
held accountable for them by others. In this second sense, responsibility ap-
pears as a virtue, a virtue “which inclines [one] to considered, conscientious, 
committed conduct.”5 This is appropriation of responsibility.
Both attribution of responsibility and appropriation of responsibility are 
helpful in thinking about supervision. Supervisors are both expected to be 
accountable for their actions (and help train their supervisees to be similarly 
accountable) and to take on responsibilities. Minimally, they must take on the 
responsibilities speci. ed in contracts or job descriptions, and they must per-
form those responsibilities in ways that are publicly accountable. Both their 
conduct and their character are at stake. From the history of philosophical dis-
cussions of responsibility, we gain at least this much insight. All professionals 
must think about what they do. They must deliberate, not make excuses, and 
have intentions that are appropriate to their position. They must be conscien-
tious, committed, and thoughtful. They must “own up to” what they have 
done. These characteristics alone begin to frame what re1 ective responsibility 
might mean in supervision.
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But when we turn from the philosophical to the theological literature, we 
. nd that responsibility takes on even deeper meanings. Joseph Bush’s apt 
review of The Responsible Self in this issue is a good beginning place.6 While 
H. Richard Niebuhr was by no means the . rst or the only theologian to 
stress responsibility, his brief posthumous study has become iconic: He 
gives de. nitive shape to the concept of responsibility as we receive it in the 
theological world today.
Niebuhr’s model of responsibility revolves around four aspects: re-
sponse, interpretation, anticipation of response to our action, and understand-
ing that we act within an ongoing community. Niebuhr called the last two 
“accountability” and “social solidarity,” respectively, though these uses of the 
terms are rather idiosyncratic. Put together, the four aspects mean that all of 
our actions, all of our choices, are understood within a framework in which 
we are responding to prior actions upon us, which we have interpreted both 
in order to act and in order to anticipate the consequences of our actions—the 
responses that our actions will generate within the community to which we 
are accountable. Our actions, for Niebuhr, must “. t” within this overarching 
framework of attention to the past, anticipation of the future, and interpreta-
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in the world, one’s responses may be limited or largely determined by role 
expectations. Indeed, to the extent that we bear responsibility or can be held 
responsible, our roles may be central. Thus, the call-response model must be 
enhanced by attention to social settings. Even the assumption of responsibil-
ity, which has largely to do with agency and character, can be wrong if we 
are assuming responsibilities that do not . t our social roles.
But Schweiker wants us to think about responsibility even more deep-
ly than this. Indeed, he argues that the call-response model that H. Richard 
Niebuhr gives us is inadequate to our modern context. True responsibility, in 
Schweiker’s view, depends on what values are basic to our moral life.16 Always 
when we act, we are choosing values to promote. Often we must make tough 
decisions among competing values. Schweiker therefore argues that the very 
integrity of existence is at stake, and that “responsibility ethics” should be less 
about response and more about discerning the values to protect and promote. 
He therefore argues for what he calls “radical interpretation,” which is “re1 ec-
tive, critical inquiry aimed at the question of what has constituted our lives 
in terms of what we care about and what ought to guide our lives under the 
demand of respect for others.”17 At root here, Schweiker is concerned that we 
live our lives not in an ongoing search for power but in a manner that will en-
hance community and respect others as persons.18
For my purposes, however, what is central is the idea of “radical interpre-
tation.” I once described feminist thinking as schizophrenic. By that I meant 
that feminists must always function on at least two levels at once: we see what 
is going on, but we ask not simply “What is happening?” but “What is going 
on underneath the surface?” On the surface, it may appear that someone is 
. red for inadequate work; but underneath the surface, charges of inadequacy 
may be an excuse for what is, at root, a festering sexism. There may be a pat-
tern in which it is consistently women whose work is found “inadequate” and 
who are . red. Feminists look for patterns, not just for situations. It is this key 
element of pattern recognition that is implied by H. Richard Niebuhr’s stress 
on interpretation rather than simply on response. We need to ask “What is go-
ing on?” not simply on the surface, but underneath the surface. Radical means 
“to the roots.” We must get at the roots of what is happening.
For true radical interpretation, I would argue that even pattern recogni-
tion is not enough. There is a deeper layer of interpretation that must be in-
cluded in the work of asking “What is going on?” Sometimes we are scarcely 
aware of what is going on, but, to be responsible, we need to be aware. Sup-
pose, for instance, that there is sexism at play, but it is unrecognized. The work 
ourselves, responding to the concrete call of the situation and being aware 
that we may be mistaken and, hence, are ultimately reliant upon grace. For 
Fletcher, there is only one rule: the rule of love. We respond in love to what-
ever is happening.
The dif. culty is immediately obvious: a stress on response leaves open 
a question as to the appropriateness of our response. Not all responses are . t-
ting. We may not need rules, but we certainly need some guidance as to how 
to determine which actions . t best in the situation. Engaged as he was in the 
“situation ethics” debate of his era, Fletcher eschewed rules. He stressed the 
“concrete calls and claims of others.”12 He stressed the immediacy of response 
within a framework of love as the ultimate value and guide. He may be on the 
right track, but his approach seems “thin” at best.
I would argue, as I believe would H. Richard Niebuhr, that our imme-
diate responses can be dangerous. Certainly, the unre1 ective response is not 
likely to be the . tting response, even if it is motivated by love. Rather, it is 
precisely the re! ective response that . ts. The re1 ective response requires in-
terpretation.13 As Bush notes in his review, Niebuhr would have us ask . rst, 
“What is going on?” The proper answer to this question requires several lev-
els or layers of interpretation. There is the immediate situation as it .rst ap-
pears to us. There is also, however, the meaning of that situation as it is en-
meshed in systems and structures—the “context” of the situation. And . nally, 
for Niebuhr, as for other Christian ethicists who have stressed responsibility, 
there is a deeper level of interpretation, in which we must ask what God is do-
ing in the situation. I will return to this last layer below, but . rst I want to say 
a bit about other levels of interpretation.
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Here, I . nd helpful William Schweiker’s extended discussion of respon-
sibility ethics.14 Schweiker . nds in the literature on responsibility ethics 
three different foci. Some authors stress the moral agent or decision-maker; 
some stress the social setting; and some stress dialogue—responsibility as “re-
sponse.”15 Most theologians, he argues, are in the dialogue camp. Their ba-
sic model is one of “call-response.” Certainly H. Richard Niebuhr and Karl 
Barth . t into this model, as would Fletcher. But Schweiker suggests that 
responsibility ethics must be able to account for all three foci. For instance, 
I would argue that, in the supervision setting, social roles are crucial to de-
termining responsibilities. While one is always responding to God’s actions 
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is acting in all actions upon you. So respond to all actions upon you as to re-
spond to [God’s] action.”23 Thus, the patterns that we are to recognize are the 
patterns of God’s actions. Through our . nite interpretations and actions, we 
are responsible to the In. nite.
Finally, then, we arrive at what Gabriel Moran considers the key to re-
sponsibility as the concept takes shape in contemporary times: we are not sim-
ply responsible for our actions, but responsible to something.24 For Christians, 
that “something” is God. For others, laments Moran, the concept of responsi-
bility has been stripped of its roots and is in danger of collapsing. What we are 
responsible for depends on what we are responsible to; lacking a clear sense 
of to whom or to what we are responsible, we risk emaciating the concept of 
responsibility. We must “hear” the demands of the situation. For Moran, then, 
“moral de. ciency is mostly a hearing failure.”25
To whom or to what do we listen and how do we hear? Listening to 
ourselves is only the . rst step; we must listen to the past as well. We may not 
be responsible for the past, suggests Moran, but we are responsible to it and 
must listen to what it would tell us. Similarly to Young, then, Moran notes that 
we are shaped by the intellectual and cultural situation and by the overlap-
ping communities and organizations in which we move. All responsibility is 
both personal and corporate, he suggests. Marie Fortune picks up this sense 
of responsibility to and for organizations and communities in her essay in this 
issue.26 We function, suggests Fortune, within institutions that set standards 
and expectations for pastoral roles of leadership within communities that are 
vulnerable and trusting. The patterns that she would have us “hear” include 
patterns of power, vulnerability, risk, and the structures of our professional 
practice. Only the supervisor who attends to these important patterns will act 
in a . tting way. Only the supervisee who learns to hear risk and vulnerability 
will be prepared to be re1 ectively responsible. Faith communities are respon-
sible for setting standards that ensure, at a minimum, that their leaders do no 
harm. Structures of accountability are vital.
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Indeed, the importance of structures of accountability may be illustrated 
by a controversy bordering on scandal that has erupted recently in the sci-
enti. c world. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
produced consensus documents for the United Nations to use in develop-
ing policies on climate change. In November of 2009, e-mails were leaked 
of philosopher Iris Marion Young is instructive here. In Justice and the Politics of 
Difference, Young tackles the question of our pre-re1 ective responses to those 
who are “different.”19 Drawing on the work of French feminist Julia Kristeva, 
Young notes that we often have an instinctive, pre-re1 ective aversive response 
to difference. We draw back, for example, when we encounter someone who 
looks different.20 Most philosophers would say that what we experience as in-
stinctive or pre-re1 ective is not a matter of justice or injustice. Young disagrees. 
Aversive responses are not simply “instinct.” They are culturally induced and 
reinforced responses, and as such, are a proper subject for attributing judg-
ments of justice or injustice. We are responsible, Young argues, for examining 
the cultural context that has led us to such a pre-re1 ective response.
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The levels of interpretation that we bring to any situation are therefore cru-
cial. We must analyze the situation, looking for patterns and for hidden or 
pre-re1 ective patterns that may be a clue to what is really happening. But 
there is yet more. As Gustafson and Laney note, interpretation must be not 
only “an assessment of what is going on, in factual terms” but also an assess-
ment of “what ought to go on, in normative terms.”21 The . tting response 
is not necessarily what we immediately want to do. To be responsible, we 
must chart a course between conformity to laws, rules, or role expectations 
and openness to what is happening and what should be happening. This 
requires, I would suggest, interpretation of the situation, the context, our-
selves, and God’s actions and desires.
For Niebuhr, interpretation itself will be suspect unless it is brought 
under the widest and strongest possible lens. “History is the story of God’s 
mighty deeds and of man’s response to them.”22 It is not enough to see pat-
terns in events or to look for hidden meanings. We must learn to see in events 
and patterns the hand of God at work. This gives us the sense of what “ought” 
to be happening. Here, Niebuhr stands in a long line of Christian thinkers, 
who see in the world around them the actions of a loving God and who are 
then “called” by God to respond. From the great Roman Catholic theologian 
Bernard Haering to famed Protestant resister Dietrich Bonhoeffer, numerous 
Christian theologians argue that we can perceive in the world around us a 
message from God and that our purpose is to participate in God’s designs 
for the world. There is no ethical dualism in “responsibility” ethics: the world 
is the arena in which God calls and we respond. Or, as Niebuhr put it, “God 
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previous hold that it had on our lives. To be sure, this is not an easy path. But 
it is a possibility for those who genuinely believe that God is acting in every-
thing, as Niebuhr would proclaim. Niebuhr therefore urges us to study our 
social history and reexamine, generation after generation, national tragedies 
such as slavery. The past must be remembered, accepted, and reinterpreted.
In Professional Ethics: Power and Paradox, I argued that one of the key tasks 
of the pastor is to name or de. ne reality.33 There is a power in naming that is 
familiar to any reader of the Bible: names are changed to signify important 
shifts in social location, to symbolize new beginnings, to rejoice at new free-
doms. This power of naming is also the power of reinterpretation. It is what 
therapists work so hard to do with their clients. Freedom comes when we 
see differently and the past no longer has a hold on us but opens up to new 
possibilities.
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Finally, then, we arrive at the key for any Christian who would be re1 ec-
tively responsible: all events must be interpreted and responded to in light 
of God’s actions and purposes in the world. For Barth, God has made us 
responsible and we are to witness to God’s grace in all our decisions and 
actions.34 For Haering, the Christian in all relationships—to oneself, to oth-
ers, to the world of creatures and nature—perceives a word and message 
that comes ultimately from God.35 For Bonhoeffer, God loved the world and 
reconciled it to Godself; hence, as we act in the world we are to participate 
in the reality of the ful. lled will of God.36 For Niebuhr, as we have already 
seen, we are to respond to all actions upon us as though we are responding 
to God’s actions. We respond in all responses to the One who is the source of 
our being.37 As Bonhoeffer puts it, “…responsibility is a total response of the 
whole [person] to the whole of reality.”38
This means that every action must be taken within the widest possible 
framework. Here, we can certainly pick up the elements of accountability and 
social solidarity that Niebuhr incorporated in his understanding of an ongo-
ing community of agents. But we must be careful that we not limit our ongo-
ing community to the immediate community in which we act. Fortune is cor-
rect that “practically we are accountable to those who credential us to serve,” 
but “ultimately we are accountable to our faith community and to God.”39 
While she puts emphasis on our practical accountability within credentialing 
structures, I draw our attention here to the wider framing of issues. Indeed, 
to the press suggesting that the work of some of the scientists was biased 
and unsupported by evidence.27 The IPCC had to admit that some of its 
predictions were based on unsupported evidence. The attack was not only 
on the integrity of speci. c scientists, but on the structures of accountability 
of the IPCC itself. While its chair has rigorously defended the work of the 
IPCC,28 public doubt and distrust began to grow, leading to a recent edito-
rial by the president of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences on the ques-
tion of how to ensure accountability within the scienti. c community.29 The 
Academy is considering various ways to shore up its structures in order to 
ensure accountability for the accuracy and reliability of evidence used in 
policy making.
Structures of accountability are crucial in all professional work. Indeed, I 
would join William F. May in going further: structures are important not only 
for ensuring accountability, but also because they “supply the forms through 
which the energies of the people of God can bloom.”30 Those who eschew 
rules sometimes assume that all structures simply constrict. To the contrary, 
good structures enable 1 ourishing. Children need not only love but boundar-
ies in order to grow up strong and healthy. Churches need not only love but 
structures in order to grow strong and healthy. Niebuhr did not stress struc-
tures, and Schweiker may be correct to argue that Niebuhr’s model is not 
adequate to the complexity of our current situation. I would argue, however, 
that Niebuhr’s stress on interpretation leads us in the direction of recognizing 
the importance of structures for complex institutions.31
This, then, brings us to a crucial point regarding interpretation: the 
question of freedom. In my view, one of Niebuhr’s most important contri-
butions to responsibility ethics is his understanding of the role of freedom. 
Where Fletcher seemed to interpret freedom as freedom to act, Niebuhr puts 
the stress on freedom to interpret—speci. cally, to reinterpret. The self, sug-
gests Niebuhr, is not stuck with the past as received. We can see in it new pos-
sibilities, new meanings, new ways in which God has been and is at work in 
our midst. In short, we can reinterpret the past.32 Take, for instance, the person 
who suffered abuse as a child. The trauma left from that abuse tends to shape 
an entire lifetime. But the adult has the possibility of seeing the abuse in a new 
way—of coming to understand, for instance (perhaps after long and pain-
ful years), that the abuser may have been herself abused or trapped within a 
hopeless cycle of pain and addiction. When we can look with compassionate 
eyes at those who have harmed us, we can see them in a new light. We can 
reinterpret their actions. We are freed, not from the abuse itself, but from the 
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There is a failure of accountability, a lapse of responsibility. Anytime we must 
ask, “What was I thinking?” we already know that something is amiss.
Re1 ective responsibility requires all the characteristics named in philo-
sophical literature: attention to motive, intentions, absence of excuses, pres-
ence of careful deliberation, consideration of alternatives, and consequences, 
conscientiousness, and commitment. But re1 ective responsibility also requires 
something else. Re1 ective responsibility is a response to the call and claim of 
God in our lives, and only when we place our actions within this framework 
are we fully responsible. This is a tall order. It is no wonder that Bonhoeffer 
cautions us that we can never lay claim to our own righteousness but must 
depend on the grace of God and be willing to accept guilt.42
Here, we are helped by understanding that responsibility is built into 
our very being as humans. We are the “responsible” animal. We do not sim-
ply “respond,” as do other animals to their environments, their enemies, their 
lusts. We are given what Mudge calls the “gift” of responsibility: we can as-
sess and plan and be accountable; we can take responsibility for our respons-
es; we can think through what is demanded by the situation; we can place 
that situation into broader and broader frameworks; we can analyze our own 
feelings and reactions so that they do not have the same hold over us that they 
would otherwise have. In all of these ways, we can be re1 ectively responsible.
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